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**Prvo nadseminarsko izlaganje**

**sažetak**

Similarity and the Structure of Representations

Similarity is widely accepted to be one of the fundamental organizing principles of cognition. In particular, it is considered to underlie such diverse abilities as inductive reasoning, generalization, and structural organization of conceptual space. Despite this theoretical success, the explanatory merit of similarity has been under constant scrutiny in an attempt to argue either for a complete abandonment of the notion (e.g., Goodman 1972) or its radical re-interpretation (e.g., Hahn & Chater 1997). In my presentation, I will propose an argument for the latter position based on empirical considerations on the nature of representations. A compelling body of evidence concerning the format of representations has been developed from recent research in visual working memory. According to this research, visual representations are hierarchically structured (Brady & Tenenbaum 2010, 2013; Nie et al. 2017) and this structure is constrained by an informational limit. I will argue that the two most influential accounts of similarity – the Spatial Account (Shephard 1957) and the Feature-Based Account (Tversky 1977) – cannot accommodate the suggested solution to the representational format problem. On the other hand, as I will show, the Representational Distortion Account of smilarity (Hahn & Chater 1997) does not assume any representational format and, instead, explains similarity in terms of transformational' distance. I will propose a way to further develop this account by using information-theoretic notions.